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IN THE SUP:till{L (~u~~~~~1 
-o-o-o-o-o-0-o-oeo-o-o-
STATE OF UTAH 
Respondent 
vs. 
E,--rJGENE MYERS 
Appellant 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
-o-o-o-o-o-0-o-o-o-o-o-
Comes nov.r the Appellant in this Cause 
having failed to obtain the effective lisslst-
ance of legal Counsel, to attempt to file a 
REPLY BRIEF to the Brief of the Hespondent. 
Appellant submits that he has had no 
formal trianing in law and is somewhat ignore 
of legal procedures; however, handicapped, 1.-1 i · · 
what the Respondent at page 17 of his Brief e:1L 
11 Misconception of the Law" the Aqpellant 
attempts to submit an acceptable tU~PLY. 
In the absence of Counsels who in fear 
of the "heatn of what Honorable, Lewis Jones 
has called a "HOT POr.I'ATO" (R. -46) and those 
la W"".f e r s 
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..... 
having strfctly adhered to an apparent tribu-
nal ultimatum of " hands off the Myers' case", 
the Appellant now stands alone - seeking some 
form of the 11 Justice for all" that he was told 
he was fighting for during thirty (30) months 
of • Honorable• service in the U. s. Navy (19L!-3· 
1946 - 274-96-14). 
Appellant submits this Reply Brief for 
l 
the purpose of pointing out misleading conno-
tations, predjudicial suppositions and generali-
zations and appeals beyond the issue; all of 
which are contained in the Respondent's Brief 
and should suffice only to insult the integrity 
of this Honorable Court and strengthen the 
Appellant's contentions of having been grossly 
wronged throughout the expiration of almost 
twen~y-elght (28) months of continuous imprison-
ment. 
The Respondent apparently labors under an 
un-American motto of • Upholding a Conviction 
obta~ned by an:r means". Which position,if taken, 
is frowned upon and proved fatal in all Courts 
of Justice. 
In one of Mr. Joseph McCarthy's "Loyalty 
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Cases'ff -.- Casc-No-.--5iF -- U. S. v. VAL R. LORT.JI~:r. 
A.justice Department Prosecutor, Mr. William 
A. Gallagher was no doubt working under the 
"CONVICTION BY ANY MEANS" theory and :forgot his .. 
" Oath of Office" and sought a conviction of 
Lorwin by unjust means, in that he obtained an 
indictment on false promises to the Grand Jury. 
When u. s. Attorney- General, Herbert Brownell 
3r. learned of such travesty of Justice, he 
caused the dismissal of the said Prosecutor, 
William A. Gallaher and issued the following 
statement to all other men of America who are 
part ot a prosecuting body - "WE HAVE A DUTY 
OVER AND ABOVE PROSBOOTIONS AND CONVICTIONS -
THAT IS, TO SEB '!HAT JUSTICE IS DONE" • 
Appellant submits that no attempt at see-
ing that justice is done in this case is enter-
tained by the Respontent as evidenced by his 
decision to pur.ue further this case that is 
almost two and one-half (2t) years old and whicl 
case has been termed b7 legal authorities as 
" IRREGULAR" 1 " UNUSUAL" 1 " BUTCHERED" • 
" Appellant left holding the bag" and " HOT 
POTATO" • 
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~&i!fi~ ft em· any 't'ossj.bl~ contention of 
"duty• 1 t ia p1a1n .from the rec~rd 1-n this 
matter and in view ot additional weight of 
authorit7 herein eited, tb&;t a. 41sregard for 
conatitut1on&l j~lat1cae and. • pa.1t10B that a 
conv1at1on 'b7 1lJl$U8t. q4 1:J4,egal means should 
be auppo:rte.4 ~ ev14ent1J' t·b• dominating 
faotora ~event::lDI ·tJhe Appelf-nt. from reoe~v-
1ns leD£ OYe%'-clu.e .... 44rea• or ~ievanoes "• 
Aw•·llaat- bu.· obaerred. YeFJ poaaible 
deliberatp twi•tlal• att.4·alterationil. and incon-
ceivable· ·•laatlap 1a .. tdlle Be•ponq11tt_s "State-
ment ot J'u,,,• lnat ~••• •·• be lured into a 
lons l'e'bu ttal of t .. t...,l'lJ". that .ahould never 
have been beazt4 •ct ._.14 bai~••n iaJ?eached, 
it had, it tu A~Uut woul4 have been accord-
ed hi a " OO .. 'l'I'l'UTIOX.U.. GUARAN'I'ZICS" •. • spec if i-
cally .. A • Pall' -1~ 11 • in the •·•nse of' havinf 
Pl'epare4 &114 wlllS.C eD\IUelJ beins confronted 
by one or two •-.~a'--t• ap1nat tliaJ having 
a coapulael'j" J*Oa••• 1J.o eoap.el the a,ttendance 
ot wi tne••••. <. .IIJU'l'IJII~ WI'.l'IBSIBS• ) 1n his 
behalf and "l'ot .. tnr1o• be tns put in jeopardy 
for the aaae etfena••• 
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rt- 1-s hite:MJ:!tting to note that at page 
3 of Respondent's Brief, he states that the 
Appellant was returned to the County Jail on 
October 26, 1955 and was not called over to 
Court and informed of his trial date until 
November 16, 19$$ ••• TWENTY DAYS LATER •••• 
can one justly say that the Court did not knou 
that the Appellant was back at the jail - con-
sistent with its orders ? That the Court was 
not aware of the Appellant's impecuniosity and 
his not being represented by Counsel, when a 
look at the record would have clearly shown 
such? How are the twenty ( 20) days of SILENCI·~ 
from the Court justified when contrasted with 
the " INSUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF TIME THEREAFrER 
GIVEN COUNSEL TO PREPARE A DEFENSE FOR THE 
APPELLANT" ? ? 
At the bottom of page 3 of the Respon-
dent's Brief, he admits that the Court ordered 
that Counsel for the defendant (App.) motion 
for a Continuance be denie~7 • Which motion only 
sought what the " Sp.preme Law of The LaRd" 
guarantees the accused i.e.,"a fair trial" in 
which the accused among other requisites would 
l 
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ha V<: tl1_0 "a~~i_s t,;..:,nc e w of Pih:.? AHED and HILL-
ING COUNSEL IN HIS BEHALF o That Counsel for 
the Appellant did not have ample time to get 
these constitutional guarantees for the Appell-
ant is clearly set forth in his own words which 
constitute his Motion for a Continuance whicb. 
is as follows: - (Verbatim) ••• 
" Comes now the defendant, Eugene Nyers 
and moves the above entitled Court for an ordE::l., 
continuing his trial date from the 25th. day 
of November, 1955 to the 5th. of January, 1956 
or some date there-after within the discretion 
of the Court. This motion is based upon the 
grounds that Counsel for the defendant was 
appointed on the 17th. day of November, 1955 
and seven (7) days is not sufficient to prepare 
a defense in the defendant's behalf. Further, 
that the defendant has a material witness at 
80 Stone St, Newark, New Jersey and another 2 t 
525 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, Washington, which 
he feels would be aids in his defense, and the 
time allotted counsel to contact these -vritness-
es before trial is not sufficient. 
Dated this 19tij. day of November, 1955 
fp,f 1D.DB Jl. ASHWORTH (R. 'P. R~) 
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At Page 10 of Respondent's Brief, he 
attampts to paint the picture that this case 
began on July 1, 19.54 with a Mr. Callicott 
signing a Complaint charging the Appallant 
with Grand Larceny - Case No. 14608; whereas 
on the contrary this oase began on March 29th. 
19.54 as Case 14571 under the name of Robbery. 
And on the date mentioned by the Respondent -
July 1, 1954. - the Diatrict Attorney, Mr• Aldan 
J. Anderson (in· .1\ldge Van Cott' s Court ) ·on 
- -
~ 
July 3. 1954. -·(sat.) deaoribed that day accurat· 
- -
ely in h1s answer to hi a honor's question of 
. -
why the Appellant vas before the Court ••• MR. 
ANDERSON I • lhe .. C~l yas on 1 SHA.l\EY GROUNDS 1 , 
your Honor and we let this man plead gUilty" • 
THE COURT: " There is nothing in the record to 
show that , _70U better get the record straight". 
The •sH.A.KBY GROUNDS " on which the Dist. 
Att., admitted the 1;#!1 (No Appellant) stood 
became •sHA:KBY" at the following time': 
L. Atter'the jurr had been impaneled and 
sworn to trr the Appellant and his codefendant·, 
OLIVER 'l'OWNBBil>, 
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-v-
z... A!t.er .the A..zsist. Dist. Att., a r::rr. 
D. Christiamn Ronnow had been"reprimanded" by 
the Court for making a"predjudicial statement 11 
before the jury in his opening address. 
3• When one of the complainants, DEAN 
JONES, was about to take the witness stand and 
a Mr. John J. Berger, (a 6aucasian) raised his 
hands for the attention of the Court and told 
Judge, Lewis that he would like to speak with 
him in his chambers.. • ( while in the judge 1 s 
chambers) Mr. Berger stated th~ he knew the 
State's first witness who was about to taki 
the stand - DEAN JONES, and proceeded to tell 
the judge what a"drunkard " and " No good thir:t_,'' 
he knew Jones to be and that Jones had "Secret1J 
married a nice girl named"Joann Harrington" and 
if he stayed on the jury he would find"FOR 
THE DEFENDANTS"• 
Appellant has since learned that true to 
the ~st. Attorney 1 s statement, the STATE was 
indeed on "SHAKEY GROUNDS" • 
When the Appellant refused the STATE'S 
DEAL to get 1 tself off "SHAKEY GROUND", Appell-
ant's lawyer, Ben D. Browning looked at the 
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clocl.{ ancl said " \-le YH:tve tHo minutes," either 
'Cop out to Grand Larceny or I•ll withdraw ••• 
(R. 7-9). Appellant submits that he was afraid 
and confused and under the coercion and threats 
of Counsel he unwillingly pled guilty to the 
SECOND INFORIYIATION alleging the identical cri:e:1s 
for which he had allready been placed in jeopar• 
dy along with a co-defendant, Oliver Townsend 
and was still in jeopardy at the very moment 
that he was FORCED to~enter the said plea of 
guilty. 
Again at page 10 of his Brief 1 the Respon.-
dent makes an ambiguous reference to the Appell-
ant's former attorney, stating that he was a 
"GOOD" attorney ••• ? ••• Good in what respect? 
Good for the state? ••• Good at explaining away 
the Court's errors? ••• Good at deserting and 
forcing a client to plead guilty while the 
STATE - not the defendant is on "SHAHEY GR.OU~TI,, 
the latter is supported by documentary evidence 
(R. 7-9) ••• What does a lawyer 1 s 11 goodness" or 
even genius mean to a defendant who cannnot bene· 
fit by such assets because he is the victim of 
a "HOT POTATO". 
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Also at. .pa.ge 10 of his brief, the resyon-
dent would have the Court believe that from 
May 17, 1954-(date of preliminary hearing on 
the instant case which at that time was called 
"Robbery") to July 1, 19.5L~ - the date of the 
trial on said robbery, Appellant's lawyer did 
not have time to"investigate" Appellant's case 
but went into Court to defend the Appellant in 
a Robbery trial with the idea of "investigatingtt 
as the trial pro-ceeded 11 • •••• States Respond. 
" After his attorney made an investigation of 
the case he felt that Appellant would be best 
served by entering a plea of guilty to Grand 
LtfFceny"••• Appellant submits that the record 
shows the contrary of _what the Respondent calls 
an "Investigation" the Record at Pages 7-9 sho1n: 
adesertion by Counsel for the Appellant and the 
use of Coercion and threats etc. - A "deal" in 
which someone (Not appellant) waived Alpellani;' [' 
Preliminary hearing om the instant case and the 
record shows (Ibid) that an obvious pact existel: 
between Appellant's lawyer and the prosecution 
which pact the Appellant 1 s lawyer refused to brerl1 
when the Appellant refused to "Cop out" (Plead 
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-11-
guil~'·y) t-o Grand Larceny. 
Surely an" Investigation" by Appilant•s 
lawyer would have revealed (As the Dist. Att. 
80 accurately stated) - that the"STATE WAS OH 
SHAKEY GROUN.Dstt. And if the Appellant's lawyer 
is as"good"as that Respondent would have the 
Court believe he is, then an investigation 
would not have been necessary to detect the 
State's "SHAKEY GROUNDS", especially in view 
of the juror's revelation and the Dist. Att. 
(Assist. District Attorney's "REPRIPIAND" recei v-
ed from the Court in the presence of the jury. 
Also at page 10, ef his brief, the Respon-
dent labels the Appellant's attempt to realize 
receipt of the • Equal pr~tection of the laws", 
along with other "Constitut·ional Guarantees" he 
fought"to preserv~" during World War II., as 
unlimited Substitution• and goes on to state that 
"StE" attorneys were-appointed by the Court to 
represent the Appellant. Who were they? ••• .lms. 
1. Mr. Allan Swan: - who was appointed tp 
prepare an affidavit in which the Appellant tole 
the Court about the- illegal tactics employed by 
the State and the Appellant's attorney. After 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-12-
compi~!n~ teh!! ~a-slt, ~J!r. Swan withdrew and he 
will state that he did not have a single differ· 
ence with the Appellant. 
2. A. Mr. Houston: - who has a deep 
Southern acdent walked into the visiting booth 
at the jail and said to the Appellant - a bald-
ing negro who was twenty-eight years ofage(at 
that time) ••• 
MR. HOUSTON: "Hello 1 BOY1 , what's wrong? ••• 
Appellant at this point was somewhat speechless 
- a man was before him - he didn't know his 
name nor his occupation; ••• something about 
th~ stranger's eye-sight gave him the delusion 
that the Appellant was a "BOY" and by some de-
duction he was able to arrive at the conclusion 
that something was wrong. Above all, he brouc;ht 
his daughter (or a little girl about ten (10) 
years of age ) along with him to discuss the 
Appellant's case. Appellant was hesitant to 
discuss his case in the presence of the young 
lady and when _I.r. Houston asked... " Vfhat color 
were these people -'white or colored'?" -
Appellant felt that this man who ever he was 
I 
apparently wanted to make a "Race Issue" out of 
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the hs& 'Whie'l{ o.P eonrsa the Appellant defini-
tely didn't want or he would have sought the 
services of the NAACP. Appellant submits that 
he could not cooperate with a man of such dms-
position. 
A Mr. DOD CASS~: Mr. Cassity• s connection 
with the prosecuting agencY should have, con-
sistent with ethics, prevented him from being : 
appointed as counsel for a defendant in a FELONY 
complaint. However, he did let the Appellant 
know that he did not wiah to defend him when he 
walked over to the jail phone and called someone 
(supposedly the_ District Attorney) and came bacl< 
to the boot~ and a aid " the District Attorney 
said that if h~ didn•t convict you for the Grand 
I 
Larceny he would place on~ of several other 
charges against you -'so you better go to trial 
right away' • Appellant knowing such a threat to 
be without any pessible merit, told Mr. Cassity 
he would go to trial as ston as his witnesses 
were subpoenaed but Mr. C&ss1ty gave no regard 
to the Appellant•& request for his witnesses. 
Letters t.o Hon. Clarence E. Baker related all 
I 
of the foregoing diseou:raea between the Appellan4 
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-lL~-
and CourE-anpointed Counsel. 
Mr. Lee W. Hobbs,: Appellant submits that !Ir. 
0 
Hobbs was very interested in his case and at 
first spent quite a bit of his time trying to 
help the Appellant. Appellant further submits 
that after having been deserted by his attorne~ 
Mr. Browning and having been treated as state~ 
by Messrs. Houston and Cassity, he was "overl~r­
suspicious" and found it rather difficult to 
grasp any·acts of honesty from what to the 
Appellant appeared to be a "Vicious Circle" 
which enclosed and protected the comparativel:;r 
wealthy few. 
Mr. Hobbs perfected what he told the 
Appellant was a 0 Very strong Prima Facie case 
of Double Jeopardy on a Writ of Habeas Corpus 'T 
1 
(In behalf of the Appellant) which Writ was 
apparently as strong or stronger that Mr. Hobl,.~, 
had concluded because the Court (Judge Van Gott 
had to switch from the "very strong case" to 
the man and made the following "Against the 
man" ruling •••• " Mr. Hobbs, this rnan (referrinc; 
to the Appellant) 1 is using sleight of hand 
tactics -trying to outwit the Court - Writ 
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deni~-. The f~~ing "Against the Han" 
ruling made Mr. Hobbs angry and he said he 
should take the Writ to the Federal Court but 
later said " the inform.ation is wrong; I will 
get you out on 'Petit Larceny' which is the 
most that the state can make out of the caseu •• 
••• this was on the fourteenth of December, but 
after Christmas, Mr. Hobbs came over to the 
Jail and appeared to be a completely different 
man in regard to Appellant's case - despite his 
former promise to pursue the question of Double 
Jeopardy further and get the Appellant's witnesr 
es before going to trial- Mr. Hobbs wanted to 
go to trial without those "constitutional 
Guarantees. Appellant could not accept such 
domination by "might alone" in the complete 
absence of any legal basis. 
On Jan. 13, 1955, Honorable, Lewis J0 nes 
sitting for Judge Ellette in a proceeding to 
determine whether the Appellant was ready to go 
to trial. After the Appellant explained the 
tactics having been employed in his case , to 
date, and the state's contention that the Defen-
dant should go to +.rial without his witnesses 
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etc. -the :Ud'ge ea.id: n lfr. Anderson, we can't 
make this man go to trial without his":HA'l,LRI..:\L 
WITNESSES", and ordered that the witnessses 
whose names ::tnd addresses Appell·ant gave the 
Court , "b a subpoenaed" rra_Yld o rde red that Mr • Hob b r 
"perfect" Appellant's appeal (from Judge Van 
Cott's "Against the Man" ruling) to the Supreme 
Court of Utah. At this point Mr. Hobbs asked 
to withdraw from the case and his request was 
denied. Mr. Hobbs, like other lawyers appointe·_: 
0 . 
in this case, was determined to disregard the 
Court 1 s orders and even went up to the Sup rene 
Court in an attempt to be relieved and was c;ivc~ 
the assistance of another attorney but still 
did not pe~fect the Appell~Ylt's Habeas Corpus 
to the Supreme Court. This is the same ~~. 
Hobbs who stood silent~y bye while the Appell-~ 1 l· 
was sent to the State Hospital AGAINST HIS urr,} • 
• • • the same Mr. Hobbs who wrote the "Card-
stacking" perjured letter noted on page 11 of 
Respondent's Brief. 
Mro Ashworth: who will be discussed on 
other pages. 
Mr. Grover Giles: Nevertheless, connected 
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"t;..J"ith ,~ prosecut1ng agency, the Appellant 
requested his services because he has the re:c.-Ju-
tation of going all the way with a client or 
not starting on the case - Mr. G·iles chose ths 
;fJ!l,&i IG~ 
latter. It is noted however that/ requested a:ncl 
received a continuance of the Appellant's date 
of sentencing to December 24, 1955 but the 
Court -probably fearful of his sternness etc. 
had the Appellant brought before the Court OlTE 
DAY EARLilm THAN THE DATE GRANTED MR. GILES 
IN THE CONTINUANCE - (December 23rdo} and 
sentenced the Appellant above his requests for 
Mr. Giles to represent him at that " Stage of 
the procee-dings against him". (See Record -
Pages 109 & 113}. 
Respondent ad:mi t s sue h act ion by the 
Cpurt in the second paragraph of page eight (D) 
of his Brief. This incident was also mentioned 
in Appellant's Brier. 
•Right to Counsel means right to Counsel 
at every stage or the proceedings" 
77-15-1 u.c.A. lt~J. 
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!t' ie ~~a on page 12 of Respondent 1 s 
J . 
Brief in addition. to page 3 that he ~dmits that. 
it. was on the Court Is own motion that the Appell· 
ant was examined by two PsY-chi~trists, George 
Roberts~and s. Wayne.Smith, it is recalled that 
in the case of ~. s: Wayne Smith who committed 
the Appellant to the State Ho!3pital has since 
been acclaimed one of the Country's leading 
Psychiatrists and_now heads the State Mental 
Hospital in Idaho. Yet iv view of thi~, the 
Responde;nt claims that the Appellant "duped" 
him into committing him to the said hospital. 
The. 1Jl1nutes of the sanity heari~g will show that! 
the Appellant DID HOT WANT TO GO TO THE STATE 
HOSPITAL and aslt .. d the Court if somehow he could 
prevent such action to ~ ich the Court (Judge 
Ellett) said ftno". 
Also a~ pages 12 and 3 of the Respondent's 
Brief, he states that the Appellant was found to 
be INSANE,by Dr. OWen P. HennAger and his staff; 
which action the Bespondent also discredits as 
having been without ·merit as is seen on page 12 
of his Brief in which he states that the Appell-
ant "&lped Dr. Henninger and his starr" into 
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believing that ne was insane. vJhich raises 
the question of whether or not the staff in-
cluding the Superintendent, ~. Henninger is 
so incompetent that a layman ( as the Respond-
ent states) can "dupe" them into beleiving the 
opposite of what is true. If the Respondent 
really believes that the taxpayers money is 
being misappropriated in the manner of paying 
an incompetent staff at the State Mental Hospi-
tal, his silence on this matter renders guilt 
on his part. 
On the other hand, if the respondent who 
apparently has had little or no training in the 
field of Psychiatry believes that the Appellant, 
a layman can "Dupe" such nationally known men 
(Doctors of Psychiatry) as Doctors, s. Wayne 
Smith and Owen P. Henninger into believing he 
is or was " Insane". What is there to assure 
the untrained (in the field of psychiatry) 
Respondent that the Appellant is NOT "duping" 
him into believing that he is SANE ?? 
At the top of page 13 of his Brief, ResponG 
claims that Mr. Ashworth never showed unwilling-
ness nor unpreparedness: suoh a claim is 
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comple-t:~~y deTeated by the record at page 81 
where Mr. Ashworth's Motion For a Continuance 
exist in which he states that he DID NOT Iffi~2 
SlJIFFICIENT TIME TO PREPARE A DEFENSE IN BE-~AL'~· 
OF THE APPELLANT. The Court's abuse of its 
discretion in denying such valid request 
brought about overt unwillingness to go on as 
seen in Mr. Ashworth's Notice of Withdrawal 
Record - Page 89. 
The Utah Statute provides that " A de.fen-
dant shall have at least two days in which to 
prepare for trialJ However, it was never intend-
ed by the legislature that TWO DAYS would be 
sufficient in all cases and under all circum-
stances. The determining factor is not 11T\'l0 
DAYS" but a reasonable time wherein Counsel can 
prepare his case or defense consistent with 
every right guaranteed a defendant by the con-
stitution and the procedural stat~tes of the 
State Ceiminal Code. It mere than two days are 
required, the Court should not, even in the 
exercise of its discretionary powers reruse to 
extend the trial date, tor to do so would be a 
a clear abuse of its discretionary powers. 
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Tr:_e two aays provided by statute consti-
tute a limitation upon the discretionary poHe:r)c 
of the Court. Such a provision protects a defe:J.-
dant from being forced to go to trial without 
preparation - adequate for his defense. If moPe 
time is required 1 it should be the duty of tl-k-
Court to extend the trial date to such time as 
may be determined by the ccircumstances peculie.:r) 
to the case at bar. Any thing less than this 
is a denial of Counsel. Common law and statute 
fully support this theory. 
Mr. Ashworth, (Counsel for defendant ) was 
denied his motion for a continuance of the trial 
date despite the fact that he was appointed 
Counsel on November 17, 1955 and felt that he 
needed additional time. This denial which 
meant a deprivation of Constitutional gurrantec:: 
for the Appellant prompted Mr. Ashworth to file 
a second motion wherein he stated that he had 
withdrawn as Counsel for the defendant - Novem-
ber 2l;tt. - f'orz:b days prior to def'p:r,nt • s tria1 . 
The motion was demied that denie~November 22 
' , 
1955. It is clear that Counsel WAS NOT PBEPAHil~C 
TO GO TO TRIAL WHILE AWAITING THE COURr' S 
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.. az. 
POSITION 011 HIS TWO NOTIONS. Hence, Hr. 
Ashworth had November 2Jrd. and 24th. to pre-
pare which was insufficient and not "Seven ful1 
days" as contended by the Respondent. 
From the foregoing fact the following con-
elusions are evident: 
1. Sounsel went otj. record as saying that 
he could not repare for trial as of 
November 2 , 19 without a contin-
uance. 
2. His withdrawal as counsel, or attempt 
to do so is tantamount to an U1fiviTLLI::~G 
NESS TO PROCEED HALF-PREPARED. 
3• Counsel was therefore denied within 
the meaning of the Appellant's Con-
stitutional Guarantees. 
Respondent's reference to Appellant's 
apparent ability to cross-examine certain wit-
nesses is without merit. For even a competent 
attorney is entitled to Counsel and it is no 
argument that education nor the lack of it is 
what determines the need for counsel. This 
#act is clearly set forth in the famous case of 
COOKE v. UNIT.ED STATES 267 U. S. 517, 45 s. ct. 
3901 69 L. :lj 767: An ATTORNEY was brought int.c Court charged with contempt of Court (Not 
committed however in open Court) and his request 
tor time and opportunity to secure Counsel and 
Witnesses and prepare his defense was refused. 
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In reve~ng the ~dfudication against Coqke, 
Oh~et Justice Tart, speaking for the Court says 
at Page 537 of 267 u. s~ 45 s. ct. 395: 
-· 
• Due process of law therefore in the prosecut-
ion for co:ntempt except that committed in open 
Court, requires that the accused should))e 
advise~ of the charges and have a reasonable 
opportunity to meet them by way of defense or 
explan-.tion. We think this include ·the assistaneo: 
ce of Counsel, if requested and the right to 
call witnesses to gmve testimony, relevant with€· 
to the- issue of complete exculpation or- in ex- · 
tenuation ot tne off'en~~e, and, ,in_ mitigation_ of_ 
the penalty to be . imposedtt • A like rule ls ts 
ne<HUl§-~:tJl:£. ,due notice and reasonable oppor-
i;unitz tO *i)~epa~e. a. def~ns(ii)_ is declared in: 
.FttAlmLIN:v. ST.ATB of ,_So~ Carolina 2i8 u.s. ·161 
JO s •. ct. 64Q, _.$4 L. E.d~ 980 
ROBRS :v. PE<J~ 199 U.S. 425, 26,s. Ct. 87, 
50.L. Ed. 256. 
" HOOKER v. LOS ANGELES 1 188 U. S. 314., 23, S, 
Ct. 395, 47 L. Ed. 487, 6~ L. R. A. 47-1 
LOUISVILLB. & :NASHVILLE Ry. v. Schmidt, 177 U.--S. 
230, 20 S. Ct. 62·0, 44 L. Ed. 747 
6 R. c. L~ P. 446 states that: " The essential 
elements of due process~ of law are NOTICE and 
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO DEFEND IN AN 
ORDERLY PROCEEDING adapted to the nature otl the 
case" • 
.. 
wThe term 'Due process of Law' when applied to 
judicial proceedings, means a~oourse of legal 
proceedings according to those rules and princi-
ples which have been established ·by o1s1.r Juris-
prudence for the protection and enforcement of 
private rights"··. 
PEmlOYER v • NEFF 1 95 U_. S. 714 (2~- L. Ed. 565). 
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.!lhe X'~enca -~o t• six: attorneys beir:..:=.; 
appointed to aid the Appellant. The essence of 
such appointments has already been discussed 
in preceding pages. If the number of cldmed 
attorneys impresses the Respondent, it should 
be pointed out that the WHOLE BAR ASSOCIATICl-; 
was appointed in the famous case of PO\·JELL v o 
ALABAMA, 287 U. S. 45 S. Ct. 55, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the appearance 
of Counsel was simp l.y Pro Forma rat her than 
zealous and active and that the defendants 1-Jero 
not accorded the right to Counsel in any sub-
stantial sense. Among other things, the u. s. 
Supreme_ Court, said at pages 68-69 of 287 Pages 
64 of 53 s: ct •••• " w hst then does a hearin.s 
include? historically and in practice in our 
country at least it has always included the 
right to the aid of Counsel when desired and 
provided by the party assertmng the right. The 
right to be heard in many oases would be of 
11 ttle avail if it did not comprehend the ri;;;i1t 
to be heard by Counsel. EVEN THE INTELLIGEnT-
AND EDUCATED LAYMAN HAS SMALL AND SOMETrnES J.JO 
SKILL IN THE SCIENCE OF LAW. If charged with a 
crime, he is incapable of generally determininE 
for himself whether the indictment is good or 
bad, He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence 
Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put 
on trial without a proper charge and convicted 
upon INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE, or even evidence 
irrevelant to the issue or otherwise INAU"1ISS.i'IL:-__ 
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequeo.te1 
to prepare his defense even though he may have 
a uerrect one. •• 
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"H.t1 ~IMS'JHiu~I:TG HAHD OF COUNSEL ~iT 
EVERY STEP IN THE PHOCEEDINGS AGAINST HIH. 
without it though he be innocent he faces the 
danger of conviction because he does not knoiiJ 
how to establish his innocence." 
At page 15 the Respondent attempts to 
show a discrepancy in the statements of the 
Appellant to the Court when a check of the 
record would ha!e prevented sucij and error on 
the part of the respondent ••• the minutes of 
January 13th. taken by Miss. Miriam E. Parker 
Hon. Lewis Jones presiding, will show that his 
honor said "(To the Dist o Att., ) " 1-JE CAN'T TaY 
THIS NAN WITHOUT HIS l}iATERIAL WITNESSES". And 
"Mr. Hobbs it is the Courtts orders that you 
'Perfect the defendant's Writ of Habeas Corpus 
to the Supreme Court". It was on the foregoi~g 
orders that the Appellant's statement quoted 
by the respondent (P. 15.) (R. 360) was made. 
The respondent vainly tries to suggests other-
wise. 
Reapondent apparently labors under the 
belief that Counsel for the defendant is a 
matter of "Either or else" • • o Either stand by2 
silently and let Court-appointed lawyers com-
promise with the state, take " short cuts" to 
effect an unjust conviction; remain on the case 
11 
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ttagainst "tne1-r -~ri1.1.~ '=lnd infer t~J.at the wrath 
of the prosecuting body forces them to stay on 
"unwillingly", DR stand alone. Such a belief', 
if entertained, appears to be definitely con-
trary to the expressed provisions of the Consti-
tution of Utah- Article Io Sec. 12 (In part) 
" In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right-to appeaz and defend in person~ 
AND BY COUNSEL"•••• There is nothing whatso-
ever ~o indicate that the defendant mustR re-
main silent while his "guaranteed rights are 
being denied him" ••• there is nothing at all to 
indicate that the defendant cannot say somethine 
about the possibility of a prison that :E:IE .ALOH~ 
will have to serve - not the attorney. There is 
not even the slightest suggestion that there 
cannot be a mutual understanding on the Cpurse 
to be pursued on a question of whether the 
accused is to be or not to be freed. Even the 
men on Utah'S Prison Death Row are said to ho.:v 0 
a choice of how their life should be taken -
surely the defendant should have some voice 
relative to his liberty or the infringement of 
it. 
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cites a case of PEOPLE V. ADANSOH wh!Bh has 
no application to the instant case at all for 
there is no showing in the record nor elsew~ere 
that the Appellant sought to delay his trial 
indefibitelyo 
As to the Respondent's decision to cite 
MITCHELL v. THOMPSON, surely the "NOTICE OF 
WITHDRAWAL -R.89 submitted by Mr. Ashworth and 
the substance of his motion for a Continuance 
R. 81 that GOOD CAUSE HAD BEEN SHOVJN WHY Tl-IG 
COURT SHOULD HAVE APPOINTED ADDITIONAL COUNSEL 
AS THE CITED CASE INDICATES IN VIE~J OF TEE 
STATED REQUISITES tffiVING BEEN f~T. 
This. contention is supported in the follu1: 
ing cases: 
PATON v. UHITED STATES: 281 U. S. 276, a12, )0 
s. Ct. 2. 53 263, 74 L. Edo 854, 70 A. L.R. 263., 
" The Court should protect the right of the 
accused to have the assistance of Counsel. This 
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty 
responsibility upon the trial judge in determin-
ing whebher there is a proper waiver by the 
accused. While the accused may waive the right c 
to Counsel, whether there is a proper waiver 
should clearly be determined by the trial Cou1.,t 
and it would be fitting and appropriate for thai~ 
determination to appear upon the record• 
also see: JOHNSON v. ZERBST, 304 U. S. 458, L!.65 58 s. Cto 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. V~6lo 
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\ 
\"' ·., 
This 11enol•alne 0mul.,t has ruled that it would 
be A PREDJUDIOIAL ERROR TO FORCE AN ATTOR1,lliY 
UPON A DEFENDANT IF HE DIDN'T tiANT HIM. 
In the Appellant's ease, the Appellant was com-
pelled to not want hia attorney, Mr. Ashworth 
upon :receipt of his .ltto:rne7'e NOTICE OF WITH-
IIU.WAL (B• 89) Which notice :to.llowed his visit 
to the count., Jail at Which time he told the 
defendant t11at h• d1cl not want to ·handle his 
"BUTCBI!RBD a.ua• eapeo 1all,- aft e:r the Court had 
made it olear to hia that he oould not give the 
Appellau.'b a "PA.Dt SIAL• 1n view or the Court' s 
denial of h1a "Motion for a o'cnt1nuance" (R. 76) 
Which MotiOD la quoted (verbatim) on page 6, of 
this b:rie.t. Hot only w:aa the Appellant forced 
to NOT WAH' hia attom.,- but the Attorney, Hr. 
Ashworth .. waa I'OROBD ft.. S'IAY ON THE' CASE' OF 
APPELLA.lft' AG.t.Df8! KII OWN WILL AND ABAINST rrrr.IL 
WILL OP THE DP.1LLA1! • 
On th11 point,. thia Court has reversed thrs 
conviction ot Bona14 Pen4el'V1lle. (STATE v. 
PENDEB.VIILE 2.72 Pao. 24• 820) • In the Pender-
ville 0&88 L&WJ"8%'8 WeN toPOed to stay on. the 
case when ·Penderv1lle did not w~t the!r 
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services. tt 1'iW:,7" 'Ue noted that in the Pender-
ville case his Lawyers were WILLING and PTI~­
PARED • Which is just the opposite of the 
Appellant Myers's case - his lawyer, Mr. Ash-
worth was neither WILLING nor PREPARED, as 
clearly evidenced by his notice of wchthdra1t-ral 
and His Motion for a Continuance respectively. 
Hence, parellelled to the Penderville case anc:i. 
equal if not stronger merit existent, - PRED~L-
DICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR HAS BEEN SHOWN. 
Respondent con~inually emphasizes the 
~~fl#lleappointments of Counsel to represent 
the defendant - two attorneys from the prose-
cuting agency and the others fearful of tribu-
ments 
nal. t!frath. Such appoint.&{ and abuse of disc ret ·:1c 
appears to be a wide spread problemg as noted 
in the following cases. 
COMMONWEALTH v • JESTER, PA. 441, 100 A. 
993 holds that under the state Constitution, a 
defendant must be gigen a fair opportunity to 
present his defense and to that extent support 
our conclusion in the instant case, although 
under different facts. Our State Constitution 
Article 1, Sec. 9 Provides that the accused 
cannot be deprived of his liberty or property 
unless by the jud~ement of his peers or the lo_·,; 
of the land. The Law of the Land" like Due 
Process of Law" requires timely notice and 
an opportunity to defendo It is vain to giye the a~cused a day in court wltn no opportUnlty 
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to pr~J.:.4. ~ it-, ~guarantee him counsel 
without giving the latter any opportunity to 
acquaint himself with the facts or law of the 
case. Nor to secure reasonable time to prepare 
the defense ••• Every man is presumed innocent 
and when accused, entitled to a reasonable 
opportunity to prepare his defense, a citizen 
cannot be deprived of due process of law, thouf)·, 
ever so guilty; if he could, it would be excuse 
for mob violence ••• (COOKE v. u.s. /cited/). 
At page 18 of his Brief, Respondent (in 
his first paragraph) attempts to make what is 
"common Practice" and what is Legal, synonymous 
in their meaning which is contrary to reason 
and the truth of law. 
"'Common Practice" may date from the burn-
ing of "heretics during religious persecutions 
in Ancient Rome to the burnings of"crossestt in 
America and in neither case were such actions 
condoned as being LEGAL however they were 
"CO'MMON PRACTICE" during their era. Appellant 
feels that the Respondent has again gome beyond 
the mssue for if "common Practice" and the 
"many instances" in which an act occurs is a 
criteria of acceptance or approval, then con-
sistently, the "many instances" of crimes and 
their obvious "common practice" would render 
them legal. 
Again beyond any form of supporting 
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evideu·e 'tl!i?ti£~o·-eVel:'~ the Respondent a ttem?t s 
to sell another supposition in stating that 
the Appellant promised to plead guilty to a 
lesser offense. If such a promise was made, it 
would logically have bean~ to a person 
called by some name, yet the Respondent cannot 
NAME ONE - NOT ONE PERSON TO WHOM TEE APPELLAl!.;.' 
MADE SUCH A PROMISE OR EVEN SUGGESTED IT OR 
IMPLIED IT• Not one such person can the Respond-
ent name no:r produce. 
Hespondent quotes 77-24-8 U.C.A. 1953 
in an effort to suhatantiate his claim; howeve1•, 
he by-passes the faot that there is a :t~i=m~e ____ _ 
elemen\ involved in ~egard to the application 
of this rule. Surel7 it would not apply when 
THE DEFENDANT HAS BlD!N PLACED IN JEOPARDY and 
the STATE is on • SHAKBY GllOUND" as is clearl;;r 
shown 1nl 77·24-ll u.o.A. 1953. 
-when the defendant is convicted or 
acquitted or HAS BEEN ONCE PLACED IN JEOPARDY 
upon an information or indictment, the Convict-
ion, acquittal or JEOPARDY shall be a bar to 
another information or 1.nd1ctment for the of.fensc 
charged in the former, or for an attempt to 
commit the same or tor an otfgnae necessarily 
included therein ot which he might have been 
convicted under that infgrmation. or indictment". 
(Underlining that of Appellant) 
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11h.el\"~onnrxcru ~~!ee~roves to be an infringe;-
me.nt ~on the "Guaranteed rights"of the accused 
it is fatal to acceptance as is seen in. 
SNYDER v. MASSACHUSETTS, 291 U. S. 97 10,5, 54 
s. Cto 330, 332, 78 L. Ed. 6741 90 A.i.R. 575, 
" The State is free to regulate the procedure 
of' its Courts in accordance with its Olvn con- , 
ception of policy, unless in so doing it offends: 
come principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions- and conscience of o_ur people as to 
l_ 
be ranked Fundamental"~ 
Still again at page 19 of his Brief, the 
Respondent asks the Court to attach some merit 
to still another supposition not borne out by 
the Record in this matter, and the Respondent 
r 
admits this - w Though Appellant's Consent does 
not appear in the record, it is most logically 
presumed that he did either personally or by 
and through his attorney agree to plead guilty 
to Grand Larceny if the Robbery Charge was 
dismissed"••• 
Appellant submits that it is clearly 
seen amid the evident uncertainty of the Re-
lpondent as to just how he shou+d s·tate his 
.claim that it may sound "logical" in_his em-
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"orb¥ and through his attorney"o•o 
Whereas a look at the Record Pages 7-9 Hill 
show why the Respondent could not land his 
supposition and had to leave it dangling in c.:;:·,_ 
air of uncertainty. At those pages is the 
TRUE STORY that has not unto this day been dis.~ 
puted that the Appellant was FORCED TO PLEAD 
GUILTY TO GRAND LARCENY UNDER Ttl~ THREATS "' .. ~.~-· 
COERCION OF HIS ATTORNEY. It is defined in L-=·.:.·.; 
that "CONSENT" under any "agreements, Promises 
prompted by threats, Coercion, duress etc. are 
VOID, and declared .for naught in a Court of 
Justice whwrein Hono David To Le-v.ris evidently 
presided in view of his granting the Appellan~~ 
a change of a Plea that was FORCED upon him. 
Another point as to consent rests in the fact 
that the party against whom the affidavit tvas 
based could not (truthrully) and did not did -
pute the Appellant's truth of his using thre.:=-~L.= 
and coercion to e.ffeut the said guilty Plea. 
The United State Supreme Court took tho 
following position relative to Mississippi 
officials using Coercion and brutality to POL.>:-_. 
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thr"ee negroes to CONSENT to signing confessio:1s, 
w Because s State may dispense with a 
jury trial, it does not follow that it may 
substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and the 
torture chamber may not be substituted for the 
witness stand. The State ma~ not permit the 
accused to be hurried to Conviction under mob 
domination where the whole proceeding is but a 
mask without supplying corrective process. 
BROWN et al v. STATE of MISSISSIPPI w 297 U.S. 
278 1 56 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682. 
MOORE v. DEMPSEY, 261 U. S. 86, 91, L~3 S. Ct. 
265, 67 L. Ed. 543; 
POWELL v. ALABAMA 287, U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 
77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527•••• 
"Nor may a state through the action of its 
officers, contrived a conviction through the 
PRETENSE OF A TRIAL which in truth is but used 
as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty 
through a deliberate deception of Court and 
jury •• o " 
M001~v. HOLOHAN 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S. Ct. 
340, 342·, 79 L. Ed. 791. 98 A.L.R 406 
At bottom of page 21 of his Brief 1 Respond! 
ent implies that what would be "an undesirable 
situationP to the state should work to deprive 
I ·' 
the accused of the Appellant of an over-due 
receipt of Justice. ••• Respondent States: 
" It would seem to be a very undesirable situ-
ation where, because of a minor procedural mis-
take on the the part or the Prosecuting attorn-1 
ey such as occurred in this case, the defendant 
in a criminal action should be turned"loose". 
It is apparent that the Respondent is 
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-a.wer.re that the APPELLANT SHOULD GO FHEE but 
he requests the contrary. Surely the Respond-
ent is aware that the following fatal items 
are contained in what he terms " A minor pro-
cedural mistake". : 
1. The Jury had been impaneled and sworn 
to try the accused (& Oliver Townsend) 
2o Consistent with the fact of No. 1. the 
Appellant was in jeopardy. 
HENCE 
3• Having been placed in jeopar9-y, the 
State could not LEGALLY bring an 
"included offense" ~ (Grand Larceny) 
against the Appellant lest such action 
clearly violate 77-24-13 u.c.A. 1953 
which expressly declares that jeopardy 
would be a BAR to an included offense 
thus giving the Court no jurisdiction 
over a BARRED OFFENSE. 
4-• Under Article I, SEC. 12 Const o of Utnl 
-· Appellamt could not twice be put in ' 
jeopardy for the same offense 
At page 20 of his Brief, Respondent readily 
admits: " There is no question about the law 
in Utah concerning former jeopardy. When the 
jury has been once impanelled and s"t-vorn the 
accused is placed in 1 double jeopardy1 when or 
if he is again called-into Court to aRswer an 
information charging him with a crime based 
upon the same facts. "' - . 
However, faulty the Respondent r s ~rv·Gon..: 
sent on the part of the Appellant may be, 
Appellant asks - HOW COULD CONSENT BE LEGALLY 
HAD IN A PROCEEDING THAT ·IN ITSELF IS UNLAWFUL 
As the Respondent Admits - the Appellant had 
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ALREALlY ~ .ESr J:GaeP-:fRDY FOR THE ACTS ( iden t t 
cal)acts) constituting the Grand Larceny as 
attested by the Bill of Particulars furnished 
by the District Attorney -Record -P. 35· 
Thus he could not_ enter cpnsent in a subsequent 
proceeding because ~ny such proceeding fDDbidd-
en by State1 s own Statute •••• 77-21.!.-13 UCA.195.:3 
w~ich is quoted (verbatim) on page 31 of this 
Brief and which definitely BARS the information 
of Grand Larceny from ever being legally 
brought against the Appellant after having been ' 
placed in jeopardy on the Robbery cliarge which 
the District Attorney states are "One and the 
same offense" • (See Record P. 35). 
The foregoing is subs-tantiated People v 
Chalmers ••••• 
" A discharge of the jury trying a party 
charged with a felony, unless for an overwhelrr-
ing necessity, such as death, insanity and the 
like, or at the request of such party effects 
his acquittal, because-the accused party is 
placed in jeopardy when the jury is swornn. 
PEOPLE v. CHALMERS 5 U. 201, 14 Po 13lo 
Nevertheless, the Respondent asks the 
Court regard such a State and Constitutional 
violation as a "Minor Procedural Erro:e" to 
allow the injustclce to age further although 
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in excess of tewnty-seven (27) months. 
Relative to the Respondent's admission 
of a "IVlinor Procedural Error" and asking that 
such be over-looked, such a request disregar:l? 
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Adr~c;n. -~ 
ment as set forth by Mr. Justice Brandeis. 
WHIT1mY v. CALIFORNIA. 274, U. S. 357, 373, 
47, S. Ct • 641, 6L~7, 71 L. Ed. 1095 
" Despite arguments to the contrary which had 
seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that ti10 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Adrnend-
ment applies to matters of substantive law ;l;;.; 
WELL AS MATTERS OF PROCEDURE." 
Respondent at page 22 ·(2nd. paragrapgll 
of his Brief states that the Appellant was 
given"an unfair advantage over the state" It 
is beyond any reasonable hypothesis that the 
Respondent can really believe a poverty-stricker. 
negro of limited education could get an "unfai1-. 
advantage over the competency and genius that 
populated the Courto Such an insult to intelli-
gence reaches its zenith when the Respondent 
states - in the same paragraph, that ••• " At 
this point Appellant was in the VERY ElNIABLL 
POSITION OF GOING TO TRIAL 
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not on the Robbery ~~.,ial as Ol')iginally set up 
but Under the lesser charge of Grand Larceny 
a charge he had already pled guilty to".~ •• 
(UNDER FORCE). 
It is somewhat unbelievable that the 
Respondent after admitting that the Appellant 
had "THICE BEEN IH JEOPARDY1 n ( P. 20 of his 
Brief) and knowing such to be definitely con-
trary_to the Rights of the Appellant~ would 
say that the appellant subsequently should have 
gone to trial at all. Above all, he states 
that the Appellant was in the"very enviable 
position of going to trial •••• ~ 
Not going home to his pregnant wife (at that 
time) and two infant daughters vh o, needed his 
support ••• 
Not going HO:HE because he had twice been put 
in jeopardy for the same offense and refused 
to help the State get off " SI-IA1CE!Y GROUNDS 11 
BUT t- ere is something to benenvied11 in a mock-
ery of justice wherein an American Citizen and 
Honorably discharged Veteran is kept from his 
family after being twice put in jeopardy, forced 
to enter a guilty plea, sent to the State 
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:ijospi'tal \-¥hen he sought "Constitutional 
Guarantees", and finally forced - without 
Counsel (Prepared & Willing Counsel), without 
any "Material Witnesses" in his behalf, and 
without being confronted with one of two corn-
him 
plaintants against/and as the duration of sucl.:. 
unjust treatments exceed twenty-seven months 
of continuous imprisonment, Respondent pleads 
" don't release him - we only made a 'MINOR 
a_ 
PROCEDURAL ERROR'" which of course is/name 
for gross injustice. 
It is noted that the Respondent dealt at 
length with the question of of the Appellant 
not being allowedm~ to enterB an amended plea 
of not guilty by reasmn of inaanity - Respondo 
Brief PP. 22-24. Which question Appellant feelr 
he has sufficiently covered in his Appellant's 
Brief. 
It is also noted that the Respondent fail-
ed to mention an "AMENDED PLEA" that the 
Appellant WAS ALLOWED TO ENTERo That Plea being 
"Former Jeopardy". The disregard or the Respond-
ent relative to this Plea; is understandable in 
view ~r the Trial Court having made (committed) 
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a 11RThVE!tSll3l:IE .t.J{RORn' in disregarding such a 
Plea in view of this Court's rulings according-
ly. 
AT RECORD - Page 173 
APPELLANT: Your Honor does the Record sho"t-J, 
I'm sorry, that I entered an A.l:'lEl\fDED PLEA OF 
NOT GUILTY BECAUSE OF PRIOR JEOPARDY. Does the 
record show that. 
THB COURT: Well, Mr. Myers, I am not prepared 
to say. The file here is very thick and it con-
sists of a lot of your papers and letters and 
pleadings and ym are at liberty to look at tho 
file and determine for yourself what it shov.rs. 
APPELLANT: Well, I wpuld like to know if the 
Court was going to be recognized well then I 
would be allowed to say something about it, 
something on the prior Jeopardy. That Plea ~{as 
entered before Judge Lewis (Judge Ellett) 
Because of Prior Jeopardy. 
THE COURT: That matter is not in issue at this 
time in this case, so far as I know. 
HPPELLANT: Yes Sir. 
THE COURT: The only Plea that is here that is 
officially made is that of not guilty and upon 
that •ssue we will try the case. 
The foregoing extract from the record 
the record in this case shows that the issue 
is not being hi sed for the first time on appe~:1l 41 
Nor has the Appellant chose this time to raise 
the point as is seen in the APPELLANT'S BRIEP 
(heretofore filed /May 7,1956) PP. 26-27). 
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Thai:J ·.the t'orest~ted. positions taken in rec;ard 
t&c.the Appellant • s "Amended Plea u of "Former 
Je·opardy" constituted a "REVERSIBLE ERR011" is 
corroborated as follows: 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED ·1@53 - 77-27-1. 
"Under this section the defense. of Once in 
Jeopardy raises an issue of fact to be determin-
ed by a Jury and the Court Co1nmits no error in 
refusing to rule as a matter of law upon the 
evidence that the defendant had beep placed in 
jeopardy by a former trial. The Court should 
require this of the jury and should not dis-
charge them unt11 they do so. A judgement on 
the verdict without such finding will be 
reversed. In re: Barton, 6 u. 264~ 21 P. 998 
PEOPLEv. KERM, 8 U. 268~ 271, 30 Po 988. 
This section was also Applied in STATE v. 
THOMPSON, 58 U. 291~ 296, 199 P. 161, 38 A.L.R. 
697· 
Documentary Proof of the Appellant having 
entered said Plea of former jeopardy is attached 
in the for.ma of ~ified copies of the origi-
nal transcript of !%' oceedings at the time of 
Plea. · 
It is interesting to note that the 
District Attorney who represented the state at 
the time t~e Appellant entered said plea and 
Hon. A. H. Ellett who allowed the Appellant to 
enter the Plea WERE BOTH PRESENT IN COURT 1VIillN 
THE APPELLANT(at Record- P. 173) CALLED THE 
COURT'S ATTENTION TO THE FACT 11I-IAT HE HAD ENTEH-
ED SUCH A PLEA. Neither his Honor, nor the 
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Districl; Attorney informed the Court of their 
participation in the proceeding l.vherein the 
Plea raised was entered. 
At page 24 or his Brier, Respondent 
possibly overly-conscious of ·the fact that the 
Appellant· should have been released at the 
robbery trial states that the jury round the 
Appellant guilty of ROBBERY which or course is 
not correct. 
Respmndent goes on to state that Luck 
testified that a watch which he had purchased 
A YEAR PRIOR to the robbery (1953) was "HE 
GUESS" worth about .fifty dollars at the time 
of the taking despite the fact that he only 
paid seventy-three dollars for it. 
A sharp contrast is noted between the 
"GUESS" of LUCK relative to his property and 
the expert opinion of the District Attorney e.t 
pages 152 and 38 respective·ly. The District 
Attorney stated at page 38 that Luck's watch 
was only worth $10.00 - surely the authoritativ' 
appraisal of the District Attorney is not to be 
discarded in ravor of a "GUESS" of a compb.inant 
whose "Guess" could contain the sentiment or 
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of having associated the watch vJi th a re la -sl-v-e 
or girlfriend. What the value of the watch ls 
to luok is not in 'dssue for personal attacbrrlen·'::; 
and/or fondness ln conjunction with sentiment 
and other irrevelant but influential facto1.,s 
would have a natural tendency to cause an 
exaggerated appraisal on the pat't of the o1rn1ero 
•Where it ia not first shown that an 
article haa market value, the answer of a Hit-
ness when asked what is the Market value is 
inadmissable" 
SMri'H v. GRISWOLD, Bun. (N.Y.) 273 
In this oonneot1on at Record. P, 152: 
MR• All?IRSOI: Now what is the value of' the 
watch that 7ou had' what kind of watch is ex-
hibit one that you •8.'1 that you had at that 
thlef 
MR, LUCKI It la a twenty-one jewel Lord Elgin. 
MR, ANDE2!SOH1 _And when had you purchased it ? 
MR, LUOltt Oh, about a year prior to that, 
MR. ANDRSOJ!a What had you pai<:i for itt 
MR. LtTCX: Sevent7-three lfgliara. 
MR • A.lnlERSOH: And do 70u have an estimate of 
the value at the ttme it was taken from you? 
MR. WOI:a Well,. I GUISS about $$0.00 
Appellant submits that probably if Luck! 0 
mother had given him the watch his answer would 
probably have been - • I wouldn't take a 
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a thott~ "-t~d della!"! fo1') ito 
Various Courts have this to say about 
"GUESS'' work and personal appraisals: 
" What a party paid for property furnis:-:.-:.::.:1: 
by itself no test of valuen. 
MILLER v. BRYDEN, 34 Moo App. 602 
In PEYSER v. LUND, 89 N. Y. App. Div. 195,85 
N.Y. Suppl. 881. 
" Holding that proof that Plaintiff paid a 
certain sum to the owner for loss of goods 
while in his possession was not proof of thelr 
value" o 
It is apparent that in the foregoing line 
of questioning by 'he district Attorney that he 
was asking for LUCK1 S opinion and even after 
he answered Mr. Anderson repeated (R. 152) 
••• MR. ANDERSON: Is that your best OPINION ? 
I.ffi. LUCK: YES o 
Hence, Luck answered as to his opinion. 
Such establishment of value has been not been 
accepted in other Courts •••• 
"Evidence of value by mere opinion of a 
witness is not suffucient unless he is sho1r1n tr:-1 
possess knowledge of the subject". 
IDMONDS v. STATE 42 Nebro 684, 60 N. W. 957 
nOpinion of value can be given ONLY by an 
EXPERT" 
ENGSTER v. STATE 11 Nebr. 539, 10 N. W. L1.53 
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"The 01.~~-not LeiHg an. expert cannot testify 
to the value or the goods to him". 
BROOKS v. STATE 28 Nebr. 389, i~ N. W. 
Rewpondent admits at page 24 or his Brief 
that the value is determined by what the Propel~· 
ty' s Market Value would have been at the time 
of the Larceny. 
Yet a·discredit to this rule is seen in 
the Record at Page 107 which contains a SUB-
POENA issued for the State's witnesses •• at 
Mid-page are the words ••• "DEAN JONES AND 
W.IYIB WClt ARE DIRECTED TO BRING THEIR WALLET 
AND WATCH .l:NVOLVIJ) IN ~THIS ACTION'' • 
Obv:t.oual7 the propertr mentioned, if the 
same, had been released from evidence near 
sixteen (16) months (July 1, 1954 - November 
25, 1955) •• ~ a:l.ateen months out of the evidence 
room ••• sixteen months away from the Officers 
who claimed to have "Initial the property and 
placed it in evidence"••• and still such proper~ 
ty, or some other propertr is requested by the 
state to usa in a proceeding that bore the narcc 
of a trial. 
If propert7 having been out of custody, 
out of the evidence room approximately sixteen 
(16) months was returned and not replaced r1r. 
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Luck ~scaLed rt; rap,e lS>lt of the record t~;.a t tLc 
band had been originally broken ••• at the 
trial the watch had A NE1~v BAND, if the sarr1e 
watch as substantiated by Arlene Thompson -
n. 28.5: 
APPELLANT: Miss THompson when you saw those 
watches down in the lower Court sometime L.1 
May (1954) when my preliminary hear was the~ec 
watches look like that then ? 
MISS. TH0!1PSON: No, I dontt believe so, thj_::' 
one was broken down there and this, there arc 
different bands on them if I remember correct:-
ly. 
That NEW WATCBX BANDS WERE VIEWED BY 
THE JURY; that improved property PART OF \'JL.I;:;~. 
WAS NOT CONTENTED AS HAVING BEEN STOLEN BY TI~~··· 
APPELLANT WAS v iew&'by and ruled on. by the jur·y 
" Was of little consequence" oi~ates the 
Respondent. 
Surely not,agrees the Appellant - the 
illegal admission of IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE on 
which the jury's verdict had to be based con-
sistent with the offense as charged - surely 
it was " OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE" to the Re snoE-
lib(n.,t~' 
dent and the prosecuting agency - their/was not 
and is not in jeopardy. 
A completely NEW BAND is put on the watc.~·L 
and the ResplDndent states at the bottom of pa.~:e:;; 
29 (of his Brief) "THERE WAS NO MATERIAL CHAHGE 
IN THE APPEARANCE OF THE WATCH". despite the 
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BANDS would naturally be a part of the jury 1 s 
appraisal and despite the fact that Luck stated 
that he had the watcij. f'ix.ed. (?). 
• The value to be proved is that at the 
time and place of' the Larceny" 
PEOPLE v. COLE, 54 Micho 238, 19 N. W. 968. 
Respondent attempts to have the HEARSAY 
testimony as to DEAN JONES pass as admissable 
despite the fact that at page 152 of the record 
LUCK admits freely that all he knew about what 
happened to JONES - IS WHAT JONES TOLD Hll1. o o 
MR. ANDERSOHt Now while you were inside and 
this robbery was going on did you observe what 
happened to Mr. Jones what he, was doing? 
· othe~ 
MR. LUCK: he was over against the/wa11. I 
could on~y see him out of the corner o# my e.ye 
and the other fellow was over him. Actually I 
ooul4n 1t see very well" 
" ~. 
MR. ANDERSONt You don't know what happened to 
him specifica1l7f -
MR. LUCK: NOT EXCEPT WHAT HE TOLD ME. 
Surel~ there is no question about what 
Jones told Iuol being PURELY HEARSAY and should 
not have resulted in its admission nor the 
receipt ot any property supposedly belongmng to 
a DE.AN JO:NES which admission stemmed from such 
hearsay testimony. 
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" A witness L.annot express opinion bottomed .& 
on HEARSAY information" 
·STATE v. r~DLEY 65 U. 109, 234 Po 940 
" Where the only evidence should have been 
excluded as hearsay, a conviction cannot be 
supported" 
STATE v. HAw.KINS 95 Ga. 201 S. E. 217• 
Appellant submits that Dean Jones or 
some one answering to that name was the only 
person according to the allegations, that coul\::_ 
say that the property alleged to have been 
stolen, was taken without his consent and/or 
that the property taken was actually his 
propertx. thus nia presence was definitely 
needed it evidence supposedly stolen from him 
was to be entered and ruled upon by a jury~ 
for the Jury had no way of knowing that a Dean 
Jones actually owned a watch and wallet; that 
he did not consent to his property, if his, 
being taken; nor that a Dean Jones whose 
property had been taken illegally) actually 
exists - DEAN JONES, 1! there is such a party 
having been injured, should have been present 
in court as held by this Court ••• 
" The accused is entitled to be in a position 
where he 1an both see and hear the witness'' •• 
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(Ibid) '' Wnere~-ulequestion of the Consti-
tutional right of the accused to be confronted :rt~ 
with the witness against him was involved, 11r. 
Justice Miner, the writer of the opinion in 
speaking of the rights guaranteed the accused 
by our constitution (Art. I. Sec. 12) said: 
" By our Constitution it is clearly made mani-
fest that no man shall be tried and condemhed 
in secret and unheard"• 
STATEv • MANNION, 19 Utah, 505, 57 Pac • 5L!.2, 1}.5 
L. R. A. 638, 75 Am. St. Rep. 753 •• 
Respondent (P, 25) states that Luck testi-
fied at pages 181-83 of the Record as to ex-
hibit having the "general appearance of Jones' 
property whereas the contrayy is noted on page 
183: - -
BY MR. MYERS: Mr. LUck would you definitely 
say that this is Mr. Jones's watch? 
MR. LUCK: No I couldn't say that. 
MR. MYERS: You couldn't say that? it could be 
anybody's watch as fap as you c~n say. 
MR. LUCK: AS FAR AS I KNOW YES. 
Thus one of the most important features 
was not established that is ownership of the 
watch claimed to be the property of an unknovtn 
man to the Court and jury - named DEAH JONES. 
uOWnership must be proved by sufficient 
evidence or the conviction cannot be supportecln 
THOI1PSON v • STATE, 23 Tex. App o 356 1 5. S. ~·l, 
" Identity cannot be proved my mere 
similarity". BUCHANAN Vo STATE, 109 Ala. 71 19 So. 410. Also STATE v. DUE, 27 N. H. 256 
Appellant submits that the property of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
supposedly named Dean Jones should not 1_l3.Ve 
been introduced upon the testimony of Luck r~.~: 
it has been already shown that all that Luc]j 
knew about Hhat supposedly happened to Jones 
is 14hat Jones told him - hence, :HEARSAY anc;_ 
following Courts hold •••• 
" Hearsay evidence cannot be introduced for 
identific{ition"o 
WHIZENANAT v. STATE, 71 Ala. 383 
GIBSON v. STATE 114 Gao 3Lh 39, S. E. 9L!.8 
STATE v. HARGRAVE, 97 N. c. 457, 1. S. E. 7?L~--~~ 
The foregoing applies to the wallets t~qt 
in the subpoena (Ro 107) the men (JOHES ~ LUCT:) 
are asked to bring them to court- (BRI1JG 
tD .. LLETS TO COURT THAT HAiE BEEN IH THEIR P02,.S-
ESSION APPROXIHATELY 16 Mos.) 
Naturally, Nr. Mchenry's Initials were 
not still on the wallets after sixteen month~c; 
in the possession of Luck & Jones; there~ore, 
Mr. McHenry had to take Luck's word for it tl1r·. '-
the same ~iallet was\teing introduced in evidorwc; 
thus another usuage of HEARSAY evidence contra1'~ 
to the foregoing authority against sucho 
At pages 30-31 of the APPELLANT'S BRI:L·;F 
Anpell~nt refers to the ~isto Attorney's 
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attempt to excuse the absence of A 'J 
JONES before eliciting the hearsay testimony 
of Luck as to Jones. In answer to a letter he 
attempted to enter the Court told him he may 
"file it but it was "hearsay" as to the fact ft. 
~ 
The following Courts have held that the 
production of .the witness is not excused by 
I 
sicJness at the time of the trial. 
R. Co. v. MAYER 91 Ill. App. 372 
THORNTON v. BRITTON, 144 PA. St. 126, 131~ 
22 Atl. 1048 
SCOVILLE v. HANNIBAL etc. R. Co. 94 Mo. 84, 
876. s. w. 654. 
(Paralysis) Reg. v. WILSHAW, C~ 145, 41 E. c. 
L. 84. 
COMM. v. Mckenna,_ 158 Mass. 207, 33, N. E. 
389 
STATE v. STAPLES 47 N. H. 113, 119, 90, A. :H. 
Dec. 565 
"Sickness" was the grounds on which Mr'• 
Anderson sought to excuse the Appellant's rie;ht · 
to be confronted by a DEAN JONES. 
Appellant submits that anly because 
property alleged to be owned by and having 
been taken from a DEAN JONES without his consent 
(consent) was entered in evidence against him 
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does' he complain about his not being present 
at the trial and especially because i' is 
clear that the property of someone other than 
luck had to be entered to satisfy the State's 
version of Grand Larceny. The only expert 
testimony in this case as to value was made by 
the District Attorner (Record P. J8) at which 
page he states that the total value of propert:;~ 
taken from Wa'J'ft• L\J.Ok waa t l!eOO dollard. • 
Therefore-the propertJ or uneatablished owner-
ship had to be added to attempt a .figure in 
excess of tift7 dollars - aa required under tLc 
info:rmat1on" and tfJDU.RSAY BVIDENCE" had to be 
entered. 
The following Ooarta have taken this 
position as to suoh praotieet 
" The values of articlea or p:ropertr stolen freT; 
different owners or even .from the same owner · 
at different tiaea 0.1\HNOT BE OOMBII.ID TO MAIIT; 
OUT AN OFFBlfSB OJ' GIUlfl) LARCENY•. 
ALABAMA • BROW v. S'l'ATE lOS, Ala. 117, 16 
so. 929. ' 
"-lhe Oonv1cst1on must be for petit La.rcen•r 
if the Prosecution does not af'f1:rmat1vely prov~0 
the value required tor Orand Larcenr"• 
PEOPLE Ye COMY.IS 114 Oale 107, 4S Pace 1034• 
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Q.Q!'!£LU S IOU Page 53-
In the foregoing pages the Appellant has 
affirmatively shown beyond any reasonable hy-
pothesis to the contrary that rights guaranteed 
him through the virtue of the state and Federal 
Constitutions have been somewhat wijolly denied 
in such specific acts as follows: 
(1.) Appellant has been twice placed in jeo-
pardy for the same offense under informations 
Nos. 14608 and 14571 both of which the District 
Attorney admits at page 38 of the record "are 
one and the same" offense. The Respondent at 
page 20 ()rd. Paragraph) of his Brief stated 
that the Appellant was twice put in jeopardy 
for ihe same offense but asks that such a vio-
lation be excused as a "MINOR PROCEDtJRAL ERROH. 
( 2.) That in violation of the State's own CODE 
77-24-13 u.c.A. 1953, another information(l46o8: 
was brought against the Ap~el1ant alleging that 
he committed the"identical and "same" acts) 
for which he and his codefendant, Oliver Town-
send were already in Jeopardy at the very mom-
ent that the additional information was brought 
before the Court and th~ Appellant was forced 
by coercion and threats to enter a plea of 
guilty against his will. 
( 3o) The Appellant was denied " Due Process 
of law" under the Guarantees afforded under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U. s. Constitution 
in that he was denied the right to the assist-
ance of competent counsel in his behalf. despitE 
the "COMPELLED" services of an UNWILLING and 
UNPREPARED Mr. Ashworth (RECORD PP.89 & 82 Resp-
ectively). Appellant was denied a compulsory 
~rocess to compell the attendance of witnesses 
MATERIAL WITNESSES" in his behalf and to be 
confronted by an important witness against him. 
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CONCLUSION - :ti. 
That is nF~H 30NES who, if existent, is claim-
ed to own the property entered against the 
Appellant in persuading the Jury that such 
property had been stolen by the accused. 
(4.) Contrary to the Provisions of UTAH's 
77-27-1 u. S.A. 1953, the Appellant's "Amend-
ed Plea" of FORMER JEOPARDY was not recognized 
by the Court nor put before the Juryo The Jury 
was dismissed without any knowledge of nor 
ruling on the Appellant's herein attested Plea 
of former Jeopardy hence consistent with former 
l'Ulings by this Honorable Court in State v. _ 
Kerm & STATE v. BARTON ••• A reversible error 
was committed. 
(5.) Mr. Wayne Ashworth, Att., was forced to 
stay on the Appellant's case against the will 
ot the Appellant and against his own will as 
seen in his Notice of Withdrawal.(R.89) Such 
force as to Counsel for a defendant who did not 
want such compelled services, was found to be 
PREDJUDICIAL and REVERSIBLE in STATE v • Pender· 
ville, (U. 272 Pac. 2d. 820). 
(6.) After the State failed to affirmatively 
establish value in excess of $501 00 as required 
and only succeed in showing that $22.00 was the 
only admissable and competent evidence, such 
evideace, if really admissable, should have in 
itself demanded a verdict not exceeding PETIT 
LARCENY0 
In view of the foregoing numerically 
arranged injustices. the question naturally 
arises - IS A CONVICTION REALLY SO PRECIOUS 
THAT IT MUST BE SOUGHT BY SUCH ILLEGAL MEANS?? 
As forestated, Attorney General, Hon., 
Herbert Brownell Jr., contends that the prose-
••t/o/J Ahas a " duty over and above prosecutions and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION -· IIl. 
convictions, that -1--s- to see that justice is 
done"• 
Justice in this case would have meant 
that when the Appellant's Co-defendant, Oliver 
Townsend, held under th~ same " Ear-witness" 
"identification" as the Appellant was released 
• in the interest of justice" on July 1, 1954 
despite the fact that at the time of his re-
lease, he was still under the Jurisdiction of 
Judge, Mays for having shot off some part of 
his wife's nose. T.he Appellant, NEVER HAVING 
BEEN UJIDER THE SLIGHTEST SUSPICION FOR ANY 
CRIME OF VIOLENCE, - Under the "Equal protect-
ion Clause" and " equal justice for al.l theory" 
the Appellant should ALSO have been released 
" in the interest of justice". Instead of beinr 
forced to plead guilty to an information that 
the State's own CODE -(77-24-13 UOA. 1953) says 
could not legally be brought against the Appell-
ant i.e., " AN INCLUDED OFFENSE" after having 
been put in Jeopardx. 
The Respondent has relied heavily upon 
showing ( contrary to reason) that the matters 
complained of by Appellant were all within the 
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discr&tioR ~ ~ ~1 Court, which of Course 
is a theory completely unsupported by the Con~ 
stitution of the State of Utah. 
The following has been said for the bene-
fit of those who would try to persuade with sucl 
a contention. • • 
" It is authoritatively stated that the 
right _of a citiz:en to 11D.le process of Law" must 
rest upon a basis more-substantial than favor 
or discretion" •• 6. R. c. L. 443• 
The Respondent at page 4 of his Brief calls 
attent~on to a supposition or rumor that the 
Appellant ~d•thBBatened_ to sing the Star Spang-
led Banner•. Any expressed desire on the part 
of the Appellant, a World War II •• honorably 
discharged Veteran should go to the credit of 
his patriotism from having spent 19bmonths of 
"Honorable SWrvice" in the Pacific Theater of 
- ~ 
War and should not be a fact0r against htm in 
a Court of Justice• 
Appellant submits that the conduct of the 
accused was that of "Myers a former mental pat-
ient" and not "Myers the Appellant", and such 
eon~ct - howe~er, "reprehensible" should not 
-
have deprived the Appellant of " Even-handed 
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• S7• 
Appel~ ~ • ~-:landed Justice" afforded 
hiall through ~he Fourteenth Amendment •• (STATE 
v. ST • CLAIR). 
In re: McKEE, 19 u. 2311 57 P. 23 and in 
re: MAXWELL 19 u~ 156, 61 P. 557• 
The following position is taken relative to the 
conduct of the accused:. 
• Every citizen regardless of his action 
OR oonaitien, is entitled to the equal protect-
ion ot the law whethe~ it ~-appl.ies to his person- I, 
al or propert'J r6gla:ta • &rery law whioh offends 
against that principle in the Fedaral Constitut-
ion is neeeasarJ17 invalid•. 
. -
A close parellel is noted between the case 
ot _the Appellant and " THE SMITH CASE" (Sat • Evn 
Post,-8-15-$3 PP!- 30 & 102-106) James Colbert 
Smith is a negro: he bas a history of mental ill· 
ness J he has an extens1 ve prior criminal record. 
•••• ~he Smith 8&Se was Justice's lonel7 orphan. 
The web that was woven 1~ it gave Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter " an unrelievable feel-
. ~ 
1ng ot disquietude• ••• the Smith case was kept 
alive tor tive 7ears only because A HAND-FULL of 
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men ~elieved the princVPles it embodied were 
vital· 1ftt l!l! ~ •• • 
n •• To be specific& do the courts have an ob-
ligation to protect.the accused who come before 
tham? Do the prosecutors share in this obligat-
ion? or is the task ot guarding defendants. the,, 
unique and lonely function of defense attorneys 
are the 
••• These/questions questions that go to the 
heart of the Smith Case and indeed they rise to 
the level ot the United States Constitution it-
selt. 
•••" Justice teeds on precedence and every 
timla.tbug such as Smith is denied his Comsti-
tutional rights. it beeimes much easier to deny 
thise rights to the pre~ably innocent. 
• As white-haired Federal District Court 
Judge. George A. Welsh - one of the key figures 
in t~is case -.ob•erved: ••••• n ! 111 tell• you 
gentlemen •• the Const1tll.t1on of -the United State: 
is ABOVE US ALL• and all I am attempting to do 
is see it the.law of Pennsylvania compels him -
(SMITH) TO GO IW!'O THE BING WITH ONE HAND TIED 
AND EXPECTS HIM '1'0-FIGHT A BATTLE ••• th!s .ia a 
moilt important situation ••• we are dealing with 
the Oonst1tut1en • - that is a document that wilJ 
be torn to shreds unless the judges do their dut~ 
ever7 bit of erosion,- every· time you belittle 
it, every time you ignore it, even though the 
crime may be heinous. is destructive to the 
fundamental rights of humanitY'"• 
••• Yet• let it be said: the questions of law 
that have been raised h~re were not posed in any 
att~Jt to whitewash Smith or deny the callousne~ 
and brutalit7 of the tilling. The one issue is 
whether what was done to htm. erodes the Consti-
tutional Guarantees intended to protect us all •• ~ 
Again the Appellant asks it a conviction so 
precious to the state that it must be sought in 
the absence of any regard tor • Constitutional 
Guarantees intended to protect.us all"??? 
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Wit-h what-the Respondent at page 17 of his 
Brief calls "the Appellant's misconception of 
the law", the Appellant now comes before this 
Honorable Court seeking justice on the fore-
going denials of 11 Guaranteed rdl,ghts" • 
Mr. Justice Coulter had this to say about 
the appearance in his Court of those persons 
often termed - " underprivileged11 , "forgotten 
- -
men at the bottom of an economic pyramid" and 
" Cursed like chickens that still come home to 
roost"••• 
Mr. Justice Coulter: 11When the humblset 
citizen comes into this Court with the Consti-
tution of his Countri in his hand, we dare not 
disregard the appeal • BROWN v. HUMMEL, 6. Pa. 
86, 97, 47 Am. Dec. 431• 
That a conviction by any means other than 
those expressly set forth in the Constitution 
of the United States should not be condoned, 
has already been shown in the foregoing cases 
cited. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has taken a posit-
ion synonymous with rulings by this Court ••• 
In re: SACHER v. UNITED STATES 343 U. S. 
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1. (195.3) - .)~it-ccr experience has sharpened 
our realization that a major test of true de-
morcracy is the fair adminitration of justice ••• 
time out of mind this Court has reversed con-
victions for the most henious offenses even 
though no doubt as to the guilt of the defend-
ants was entertained. They webe reversed becaus(~ 
THE MODE BY WHICH GUILT WAS ESTABLISHED, disre-
garded those standards which are so precious an. 
so important to our society". 
The Appellant should no longer be held 
in excess of the near twenty-eight (28) months 
that he has spent continuously behind prison 
walls, during which time clearly violated 
rights have gone without any for.m of redress. 
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